2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 3rd meeting of Main Committee II
Held at Headquarters, New York, on 23 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Molnár ..... (Hungary)

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Report of Main Committee II

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Report of Main Committee II

1. **The Chairman** drew attention to the report of Main Committee II contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/MC.II/CRP.3.

2. **Mr. Choisuren** (Mongolia) said that nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in promoting the peaceful global objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Their contribution towards the twin goals of disarmament and non-proliferation had been fully recognized in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. While the family of nuclear-weapon-free zones had expanded significantly over the years, much remained to be done to further consolidate the respective regimes under the various treaties. For the existing zones to be fully operational and effective, it was essential for all concerned States to sign or ratify them at an early date. With the notable exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, progress on other nuclear-weapon-free zones remained disappointing. The recent convening in Mexico of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones had therefore been a welcome development. The Conference had reaffirmed participating States' commitment to strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones and contributing to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It had also opened up a new chapter in the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones by discussing potential cooperation and implementation measures among the zones, their respective treaty-based agencies and other interested States.

3. His delegation fully supported the strengthening of existing zones as well as the establishment of new ones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned. It welcomed, in that respect, the substantial progress achieved to date on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The establishment of such a zone in the Middle East would have a direct bearing on peace and stability in that region and was long overdue.

4. Mongolia's own nuclear-weapon-free zone could serve as a good model for other countries in the subregion of North-East Asia, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. With respect to that country, his Government continued to support the multilateral peaceful process of engagement in dialogue. It therefore urged all concerned parties to exercise the utmost flexibility and mutual respect and to return to the six-party talks. His Government would continue its efforts to further institutionalize Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. To that end, it would resume consultations on the conclusion of a trilateral treaty with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. His delegation also wished to have elements reflecting the unique status of Mongolia incorporated in the report of Main Committee II and the final document of the present Review Conference.

5. **Mr. Shin Kak-soo** (Republic of Korea) said that the NPT was facing unprecedented and multifaceted challenges, the most serious of which being the violations committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The international community should stand together to persuade the latter that it stood to gain nothing and to lose everything from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In that regard, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should dismantle all its nuclear programmes in a thorough, transparent and verifiable manner and an expeditious resolution should be sought through peaceful and diplomatic means within the framework of the six-party talks.

6. The outstanding questions relating to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran should also be resolved expeditiously through extensive consultations and with the full cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004 between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom should be maintained.

7. Universal adherence to the NPT was a key issue for all States parties to the Treaty but could not be attained while three States remained outside the Treaty. The Review Conference would also have to adequately address the new threat to the universality of the Treaty following the announcement of withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Moreover, the dangers of State and non-State actors working together needed to be urgently addressed and, in that respect, the procurement network discovered in Pakistan should serve as a grave warning. A strengthened non-proliferation regime was thus vital to prevent the illicit trafficking of sensitive nuclear material, equipment and technology.

8. Given the current international security environment, the importance of an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards system could not be overemphasized. The early universalization of additional protocols would greatly enhance the Agency's inspection and verification capabilities. Those States that had yet to sign or ratify them should therefore do so without delay. His Government also supported the idea that strengthened safeguards should be a condition for the supply of nuclear items. However, since no verification measure could be entirely foolproof against determined proliferators, it supported the international community's ongoing efforts to strengthen existing control regimes.

9. Innovative and supplementary export control measures were also needed. Thus, while endorsing the leading roles of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in establishing international export control standards, his Government also supported the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G-8 Global Partnership) and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in so far as they dealt with the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and related materials involving non-State actors. His Government attached particular importance to the establishment and effective implementation of national export controls, as called for by the resolution.

10. The Republic of Korea had held the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group for 2003 and 2004 and was fully committed to the non-proliferation objectives of the Group. It had also assumed the chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime for 2004 and 2005. In 2004, it had joined the global non-proliferation efforts of the G-8 Global Partnership.

11. His Government acknowledged the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in enhancing global and regional peace and security. Such zones had been, and would remain, useful non-proliferation and disarmament tools. The achievements of those zones should contribute towards the ultimate goal of NPT: a nuclear-weapon-free zone spanning the entire globe.

12. **Mr. Ubeev** (Russian Federation), referring to article III of the NPT, said that the implementation of IAEA safeguards was an important prerequisite for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The task of further strengthening the Agency's monitoring activities and safeguards system was a priority. While expansion of the application of additional protocols to safeguards agreements had allowed the Agency to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system, the implementation expenses thereof should be optimized.

13. The existence of additional protocols, which helped to detect potentially undeclared activities, should be one of the criteria used for decisions on nuclear exports. The Russian Federation was already prepared to accept additional protocols as one of the conditions for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment. His Government had provided, and would continue to provide, assistance in strengthening the Agency's safeguards system through the financing of a national programme of scientific and technical support for Agency safeguards. Furthermore, given the real danger that nuclear power developments might be diverted to military purposes, it stood ready to establish strict criteria to regulate the transfer of the most sensitive nuclear technologies. His delegation agreed with the Director-General of the Agency that there was no need for additional facilities since the world already had more than enough operating capacity to provide fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors. It was important to establish a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply system and to develop long-term options for the management of the technologies, primarily in regional centres under multinational control.

14. In the context of efforts to prevent highly enriched materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, with the participation of the Agency, were cooperating on the repatriation of highly enriched uranium fuel from the research reactors of third countries. Furthermore, in response to an Agency initiative, 13 out of 17 countries had confirmed their decision not to use highly enriched fuel in their reactors in future.

15. The discovery of an extensive black market network in nuclear materials and technologies posed a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Export controls were one of the most important means of countering that threat. Measures to prevent unlawful transfers of controlled goods and technologies included raising export control efficiency, strengthening international export control regimes, increasing their transparency and involving countries with nuclear technologies in export control regimes.

16. His delegation supported the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee. They had shown that it was practicable to establish an agreed procedure for the transfer of controlled items without limiting legal rights to international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

17. Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty could be implemented only if there was a clear understanding of its technical implications. In that regard, the "trigger list" developed by the Zangger Committee was an integral part of additional protocols to safeguards agreements. Bilateral and multilateral export controls could help improve transparency, facilitate the exchange of experience and foster a dialogue with countries that were not members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

18. All countries should implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which had been adopted following a Russian initiative. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) should also identify the remaining weak points in the non-proliferation regime and coordinate assistance for the effective implementation of all provisions of the resolution.

19. While some progress had been made over the previous five years in the development of the Agency's safeguards system, it was clear that difficult tasks lay ahead if the obligations provided for in article III of the Treaty were to be implemented effectively.

20. **Ms. García Guerra** (Mexico) said that her delegation attached a high priority to the work of the Committee, particularly its examination of the application of article VII of the NPT with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Treaties establishing such zones were an important means of strengthening the concept of horizontal non-proliferation. The States that acceded to those treaties and to the NPT had unequivocally demonstrated their commitment to non-proliferation.

21. The declaration approved at the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, was of particular relevance to the Review Conference in demonstrating the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Her delegation had requested that the main documents from that Conference should be issued as official documents at the present Review Conference. During the Conference the Mexican Government had also held a parallel meeting with the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament and Mayors for Peace. Their report, presented at the closing session of the Conference, also formed part of the documents to be circulated. As stated in the Rapporteur's report on the deliberations of the Conference, an agreement had been reached to maintain such conferences of nuclear-weapon-free zones in conjunction with NPT review processes.

22. Her Government was confident that the Conference had facilitated the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. It had also provided an acknowledgement by all nuclear-weapon States and other States of the status of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, with a view to attaining the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

23. **Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands), said that his Government had long supported efforts to make the NPT review process better able to enhance the operation of the Treaty and had systematically searched for ways to streamline review procedures and make the best possible use of the outcomes of previous Review Conferences.

24. The two most recent review cycles had shown that the current system did not fully serve its intended purpose and needed further refinement. To that end, his delegation, following consultations, had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.51) which contained proposals for modest steps that would help to make the review process more effective and simpler. The proposals were intended solely as additions to and refinements of the procedures already in place and should by no means be seen as replacing them. The working paper, which was not intended to be exhaustive, reaffirmed the provisions in the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It also stressed the role that the Preparatory Committee should play in addressing matters of urgent concern that might arise between Review Conferences. While there was merit in the proposal by the delegation of Canada for annual conferences to be held to decide on important issues, such a proposal might go too far beyond the scope of the 1995 decision. His delegation's proposal, however, would serve virtually the same purpose, except that it did not provide for a meeting in the year following the Review Conference. In the event of

exceptional circumstances, the text also provided for the possibility of a special meeting being called by the depositaries, either on their own initiative or at the request of other States parties to the Treaty.

25. Referring to paragraph 5 of the working paper, he stressed that the Preparatory Committee should prepare its own procedures at an early stage and the first priority of the last meeting in the preparatory cycle should be to finalize all the procedural preparations for the 2010 Review Conference. He also drew attention to paragraph 6 of the working paper, which called for two reports from the last session of the Preparatory Committee: one on procedural issues and one on recommendations. He hoped that the new wording made clear that the Preparatory Committee was required to make a concentrated effort to reach a consensus on its recommendations. If it failed to do so, the Review Conference should be informed of the reasons why. Paragraph 7 of the working paper aimed at the fullest possible participation of civil society in the review process, which already partly reflected the current reality. He hoped that modalities would be found to give full effect to those proposals.

26. **Mr. Ogunbanwo** (Nigeria) said that nuclear-weapon-free zones had made an important contribution towards the promotion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime at regional levels. The zones established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba were a positive step towards attaining the goals of global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. His delegation supported the establishment of new regional nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States in the regions concerned. In that regard, it welcomed the decision of all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible, supported Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and affirmed the need not only to establish such a zone in the Middle East but also to achieve the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

27. Nigeria had played a crucial role in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa under the Pelindaba Treaty and had demonstrated its strong commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it in 2001. His Government would continue to remain faithful to its obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty and, in that respect, called on all States that had not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible so that it could enter into force without further delay.

28. The recently convened Conference in Mexico would continue to enhance cooperation among treaty-based zones and would strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zone regime, thereby contributing to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The declaration it had adopted was welcome and would provide useful input for the current Review Conference.

29. In view of the discouraging lack of progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, States must reaffirm their NPT commitments towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The present Committee had a crucial role to play in that regard. To make further progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference also needed to be implemented.

30. Nigeria strongly supported IAEA as the only international safeguards and verification authority. The Agency was to be commended for its good work in meeting the various verification challenges within its mandate, and it should therefore continue to be encouraged and strengthened. The initiative to establish a special committee on safeguards and verification was worthy of consideration in that respect. Such a committee should consider extending the Agency's verification activities to all nuclear-weapon States, so that both vertical and horizontal proliferation could be controlled. The verification system of the NPT would thereby be strengthened, since all States would share responsibility for non-proliferation.

31. All States parties to the Treaty should also negotiate and conclude the Model Additional Protocol with the Agency, as a matter of priority, and work towards building the necessary confidence among all States parties to the Treaty. The Government of Nigeria had signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in September 2001 and was currently giving serious and active consideration to its ratification.

32. However, like other developing countries, Nigeria also needed assurances from the Nuclear Suppliers Group that it would not be denied access to the vital nuclear technology and material needed for its socio-economic development, including for electricity generation. Nigeria's electricity demand would soon

outstrip current electricity generating capacity by about five times, making nuclear energy the only affordable and environmentally safe option available. Since Nigeria was committed to the peaceful development of nuclear science and technology, any restrictions placed on the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or technology for peaceful purposes would be in violation of article III of the Treaty. The Review Conference must therefore take steps to protect the right of all States to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national interests and priorities. It must also provide credible assurances to that effect.

33. **Mr. Semmel** (United States of America) said that the international community needed to work together to tackle the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Parties to the NPT had faced significant challenges recently, particularly from States that had cheated on their obligations and had defied the international community.

34. Progress had been made in some areas: Libya and Iraq no longer pursued weapons of mass destruction. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran retained their nuclear ambitions and were in violation of the Treaty. The present Review Conference therefore needed to reinforce the goal of universal accession to the Treaty and encourage Israel, India and Pakistan to take the sovereign decision to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States. That approach required a viable security framework ensuring compliance with the Treaty. His Government welcomed and encouraged all non-parties to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and insisted that all parties to the Treaty should comply with their obligations. Ultimately, a rigorous approach to compliance would help to promote NPT universality by demonstrating to non-parties that the Treaty could provide meaningful and enduring security benefits.

35. The achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East remained a key foreign policy goal. His Government was committed to a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute by means of the road map.

36. In the context of a stable, comprehensive regional peace, the United States supported the goal of an effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, progress towards that goal required the creation and cultivation of a political environment in the Middle East that would reduce the causes of hostility in the region and gradually move States towards a regional situation conducive to such a zone. Peace would also contribute to regional security by generating the confidence and trust needed to address the complex issues associated with establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The United States Government would support the convening of a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions. It hoped that a way forward could be found to hold those discussions.

37. However, there could be little hope of establishing an agreement to create a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone unless the nations of that region implemented and upheld existing agreements to which they were parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran was a case in point. Seven Agency reports since 2003 had confirmed that it had been pursuing a covert nuclear programme for nearly two decades. The Islamic Republic of Iran's desire for sensitive technologies, even in the face of international concern, was inconsistent with its energy and economic interests and was destabilizing for the region.

38. Despite the Islamic Republic of Iran's claims of compliance, the Agency had reported that the Iranian authorities had still denied inspectors the transparency and cooperation they need to fulfil their duties. Moreover, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to deny the explicit requests in previous Agency resolutions not to proceed with the construction of a heavy-water research reactor at Arak and had failed to provide a credible explanation for its urgency to complete a reactor well suited to the production of plutonium. Iranian refusals to allow full and prompt access to locations of concern, Iranian experts or nuclear-related documentation were unacceptable. The Agency would be unable to resolve the questions raised by the Islamic Republic of Iran's longstanding clandestine nuclear programme and breaches of its safeguards agreement unless the Iranian authorities provided full cooperation.

39. The Agency's Board of Governors should have reported the Islamic Republic of Iran's violations of its safeguards obligations to the United Nations Security Council when they had first been confirmed. Such action would have reinforced the Agency's essential investigatory and monitoring roles and the Security Council had the necessary international legal and political authority that might be required to bring the

issue to a successful and peaceful diplomatic resolution. His Government joined the international community in supporting the ongoing efforts of the United Kingdom, France and Germany to resolve the issue through diplomacy. However, should the Islamic Republic of Iran break its pledge to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, the United States would join those three countries in calling for an immediate report to the Security Council.

40. The only plausible explanation for Iran's longstanding pattern of deception was that it had been pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, in violation of article II of the NPT. Given its history of clandestine nuclear activities and documented efforts to deceive the international community, the Islamic Republic of Iran would have to demonstrate that it no longer sought to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Only the full cessation and dismantling of fissile material production by the Iranian authorities could begin to provide any assurance that they were no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. His Government was not attempting to rewrite the NPT, as the Iranian authorities had claimed. Nor did it aim to deny States that complied with the Treaty the exercise of their legitimate rights. On the contrary, its position stemmed from its commitment to uphold the goals and rules of the Treaty. For the sake of regional and global security, including the integrity of the NPT and hopes for its future universality, his Government looked forward to working with the entire international community to convince Iran to forgo the nuclear path it had chosen thus far.

41. The nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also presented a threat to regional and global security as well as an urgent challenge to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. That country had repeatedly violated its international non-proliferation obligations and had announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. The danger that it could produce and export fissile material or weapons to other rogue States or terrorists must not and could not be ignored. The United States Government had repeatedly made clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the highest levels, that it sought a peaceful, diplomatic solution resulting in the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its entire nuclear programme.

42. While welcoming recent signs of improved relations between India and Pakistan, his Government continued to urge both countries, inter alia: to end their nuclear and missile competition; to discuss and implement confidence-building measures that would reduce regional tensions and diminish risks of nuclear weapons being used, either intentionally or accidentally; not to conduct nuclear tests; to bring an early end to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; to support the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; to prevent onward proliferation; and to bring their export controls into line with international standards.

43. His Government remained cognizant of its non-proliferation commitments and objectives when considering how to improve its bilateral relations with each country. Its actions with respect to India and Pakistan continued to be consistent with its obligations under the NPT and its commitments to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It regarded the NPT as a key legal barrier to nuclear proliferation which made a critical contribution to international security. Concerted international action was needed to tackle the critical cases of non-compliance confronting the Treaty; otherwise its credibility risked being undermined.

44. **Mr. Lazo-García** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that, as a party to the NPT, his country was fully committed to the principles of general and complete disarmament and supported such initiatives as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The elimination of all weapons of mass destruction under strict international verification required compliance with the Treaty and the approval of effective measures.

45. In that connection, his Government joined other countries in calling on Israel to unconditionally accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State, to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and to declare its support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The creation of such a zone would be welcomed by the international peace-loving community and would represent a further step towards ensuring that nuclear-weapons States did not use their weapons against the States that belonged to such zones.

46. His Government welcomed China's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to threaten to use them against non-nuclear States. It hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would also provide the same reassurances.

47. The position of the United States with regard to the non-proliferation initiative would result in a violation of the basic principles that had been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and acknowledged in international law, namely non-interference in the internal affairs of States and non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

48. His delegation reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

49. **Mr. Belaoura** (Algeria) said that the NPT provided an ideal framework for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. However, while some success had been achieved under the non-proliferation regime, the progress expected on general and complete nuclear disarmament had yet to be achieved.

50. Algeria had become a party to all the treaties and international conventions relating to weapons of mass destruction and was fully implementing its obligations in that respect. Furthermore, having already ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), his Government intended to sign the Protocol thereto. It called on all States to work towards the ratification of that Treaty as well as the conclusion of an equally important fissile material cut-off treaty.

51. His delegation supported the work being carried out by IAEA in accordance with its mandate and agreed that existing Agency mechanisms would be sufficient to achieve the goal of non-proliferation. However, to achieve the ultimate aim of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, all nuclear-weapon States must respect their obligations under the NPT and seriously undertake to implement the commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference, particularly the 13 practical steps.

52. Any initiatives aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime must not restrict the rights of States parties to the Treaty under article IV. In that respect, the Agency's positive efforts to promote technical assistance and the strengthening of nuclear safety were welcome. His delegation stressed that the Agency was the only competent authority capable of implementing the safeguards system and monitoring compliance with safeguards agreements.

53. Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT was a direct threat to international peace and security as well as an obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Any policy aimed at extending the present nuclear non-proliferation regime while maintaining nuclear arsenals was unviable. To ensure the credibility of the Treaty all States should progressively disarm, accede to the Treaty and implement the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the current Review Conference.

54. **Mr. Motoc** (Romania) said that it was essential to place nuclear materials and technologies under the International Atomic Energy Agency integrated safeguards system. His Government strongly supported the universal adoption and implementation of additional protocols, which established new verification standards for the NPT and strengthened the Agency's ability to detect and respond to non-compliance with safeguards obligations. Continued efforts were needed to expand the conclusion of additional protocols and to make them a condition for the supply of nuclear material and technology.

55. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had contributed steadily to reducing the uncontrolled spread of materials and technologies to potential proliferants. Supplier States should seriously consider the possibility of suspending nuclear cooperation with countries found by the Agency to be in breach of their safeguards undertakings. All States needed to do more to ensure that their exports did not find their way into nuclear weapons programmes. To that end, export control policies should reinforce safeguards standards. Other useful tools that States could use to reduce proliferation risks included "catch-all controls", information exchange and outreach activities.

56. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) emphasized the greater responsibility of all States for reducing proliferation risks and filled in the gaps in existing non-proliferation regimes, thus providing a meaningful framework in which all States could adopt and enforce appropriate, effective non-proliferation laws.

57. The globalization of terrorism was a phenomenon that did not leave room for isolated approaches. In addition to their reporting and implementation obligations, Member States had a moral responsibility to take all possible steps to prevent weapons of mass

destruction from falling into the hands of non-State actors. His Government was determined to participate in all international counter-terrorism actions and initiatives and would continue to support multilateral and bilateral initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

58. The Romanian Government had taken practical steps to complete two important projects with the assistance and support of the United States and IAEA: full conversion of the TRIGA research reactor at Pitesti from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium; and the return of fresh fuel from the WWR-S research reactor at Magurele to the Russian Federation. An example of the Romanian Government's commitment to combating terrorism was its organization, in cooperation with the Agency, of a regional pilot course for south-eastern Europe on techniques for counteracting nuclear threats. Following a mission from the Agency's International Physical Protection Advisory Service, Romania's nuclear regulatory body had also started an upgrade of national nuclear physical protection systems.

59. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that revelations about the existence of an illicit network for trafficking in nuclear material, equipment and technology presented a serious challenge to the NPT and to the non-proliferation regime in general. Valuable lessons had already been learned from collective recent experience of that illicit network and all States needed to cooperate with IAEA in order to address that challenge. His delegation recognized the need to review and improve controls over nuclear material, equipment and technology in order to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and illicit trafficking. There was also a need to review existing penalties for those grave offences. His delegation also fully supported proposals to examine the financial support behind illicit networks. However, it was equally important to recognize that the success of international efforts to bring individual offenders to justice largely depended on the sharing of information between States and IAEA. Such information exchange also helped to build confidence among States, which in turn enabled everyone to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including the Agency.

60. His delegation had taken note of the statement by the European Union and, in that regard, welcomed the efforts being undertaken to dismantle illicit trafficking networks in four countries of the southern hemisphere, including South Africa. However, since the statement had made no reference to key European and other countries where such illicit networks operated and where important investigations and other initiatives had been initiated by the authorities, his delegation was anxious to thank those countries for their efforts and to emphasize the need for all countries concerned to cooperate with each other and with the Agency. It was also important to avoid giving the impression that the networks in the four countries mentioned were the ones of primary importance. The European Union might therefore wish to clarify that matter. For its part, South Africa would continue to cooperate closely with the Agency and with European and other countries in their investigations into illicit international networks with a view to their elimination.

61. Experience had shown that no control regime, however comprehensive, could provide a full guarantee against abuse. The challenge ahead was not only how to provide access to technologies for peaceful purposes but also how to share information in a timely fashion, thereby enabling countries to detect, investigate and prosecute those involved in illicit activities.

62. **Ms. Pollack** (Canada) said that a number of countries had supported her delegation's proposal to rearrange the meetings of NPT States parties. The lack of any supporting mechanism for the Treaty called for remedial action. Recent experience had only reinforced the view that the current NPT meetings format did not serve the needs of its parties and that its exclusively preparatory focus was too narrow.

63. In its working paper entitled "Achieving permanence with accountability" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39), her delegation had shown that the strengthened review process had not been playing the role initially envisaged for it at its inception. The spirit of 1995 had to be adapted to the realities of 2005. The need for change had also been acknowledged by others, including in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.51. Her delegation's working paper proposed that a one-week annual Conference of States parties to the Treaty should be held in each of the four years between Review Conferences. That timetable would allow for more effective consideration of the issues and provide for flexibility in responding to recent developments while enabling States parties to take decisions if required. Such an annual meeting would also allow States parties to address the Treaty's state of health and to raise topical concerns about implementation.

64. The substantive focus of an annual conference would do much to strengthen the NPT and its implementation. In the two years immediately preceding a five-year Review Conference, the annual conference would be extended by one week to carry out the functions of a Preparatory Committee. The Preparatory Committee would finalize the procedural arrangements and make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations for that Review Conference.

65. Her delegation had also proposed that a standing bureau should be established to provide improved continuity and better preparation of meetings. It would be most effective to have the standing bureau in place before the first meeting. She looked forward to the incorporation of the ideas put forward in the working paper into the outcome of the Review Conference.

66. She welcomed the fact that the Subsidiary Body in Main Committee III was considering the role of an extraordinary meeting of States parties in the event of a withdrawal. Such a meeting should be held automatically within two weeks' notice of a withdrawal.

67. Her delegation very much supported enhancing the engagement of civil society in the work of the NPT and welcomed efforts to further facilitate and optimize their participation.

68. **Mr. Naziri Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA; its comprehensive safeguards agreements had been recognized as the primary legal basis for ensuring that no diversion of nuclear material occurred within States' nuclear programmes. Those agreements had been successful in providing assurances in respect of declared nuclear material and had provided some assurances regarding the absence of undeclared material and activities; they should therefore be promoted and universalized.

69. The three pillars of IAEA — enlarging the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, verifying nuclear materials and activities and enhancing the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities — should be accorded equal political and financial support. It was a source of deep concern that efforts were being made to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes. Adequate resources and support should be provided in order to ensure that the programme remained firm, sustainable and predictable.

70. The obligation to accept safeguards must not be viewed in isolation from article IV of the Treaty. Despite decisions taken at the previous review conferences, non-nuclear-weapon States parties faced the threat of attack from certain nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty. That threat was so serious that the United States of America had explicitly named non-nuclear-weapon States parties as the targets of its deployed nuclear weapons. Such attacks would have severe, humanitarian, environmental, political and economic consequences and would threaten the Treaty's credibility. States parties should undertake not to assist, encourage or take any action that would result in an armed attack by conventional or other weapons against nuclear facilities under the full scope of IAEA safeguards.

71. Unilateral criteria-setting and the imposition of double standards in the areas of safeguards and technical cooperation were detrimental to the credibility of IAEA; the role of its safeguards system should be the only criteria for verification of compliance with article II obligations. National export controls should in no way restrict the transfer and exchange of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes between States parties to the Treaty. Non-transparent and discriminatory controls could only provoke suspicion and mistrust. Any supplier arrangement should be promoted transparently through a framework of dialogue among all interested States parties.

72. The idea of "counter-proliferation", as opposed to "non-proliferation", went beyond the essential foundations of the Treaty, which provided clear mechanisms for verification of compliance and collective action to address cases of proliferation. No rule of international law authorized any State party to a treaty to claim a superior enforcing role, nor did internationally recognized rules permit any State to hinder free navigation on the high seas. Any effort to recognize any State party's special status in that regard or to support new divisions among States parties was unacceptable.

73. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, to which the only obstacle was Israel, was a longstanding goal of the people of that region. The resolution on the Middle East, as

reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, was an essential element of the package of agreements which had been adopted in 1995 and on the basis of which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended without a vote. However, despite repeated calls by the international community, Israel had not acceded to the Treaty or declared its intention to do so, nor had it placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

74. Israel's unsafeguarded facilities and clandestine nuclear activities, to which the United States of America had turned a blind eye, posed a real threat to security in the Middle East. An agreed plan of action for the universality of the Treaty, especially in the Middle East, should be on the agenda of all States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, and greater pressure should be placed on Israel to accede to the Treaty promptly and without conditions and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

75. The United States of America was bent on maintaining undue pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran by polarizing technical issues, misrepresenting facts and making advance judgements despite IAEA declarations that the Islamic Republic of Iran had cooperated with it actively and had granted access to Iranian nuclear facilities. In November 2004, the Director-General of IAEA had stated that all declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran had been accounted for and was not being diverted to prohibited activities and that almost all its nuclear activities were under routine safeguards implementation.

76. The Islamic Republic of Iran could not rely on the international nuclear fuel market to meet its domestic needs, as the delegation of the United States of America had proposed, since there were no assurances concerning the supply of such fuel to developing countries which were Parties to the Treaty. Moreover, during the past 25 years, the United States had done its utmost to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran was denied access to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Nuclear fuel had never been made available to any developing country without conditions, and those countries simply could not rely on empty promises that continually proved false and misleading.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.